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Case No. 16941 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
--0000000--
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs commenced this action to compel defendants to sell 
approximately 142 acres of ground in North Utah County, or in the 
alternative for damages. Defendants counterclaimed for damages 
caused by plaintiffs clouding the title to the land and for their 
attorney's fees. After the trial had commenced, plaintiffs 
withdrew their cause of action for specific performance and 
proceeded only on their claim for damages~ 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried without a jury before the Honorable Don V. 
Tibbs, who entered judgment in favor of plaintiffs and against the 
defendants for the sum of $35,000 together with 8 percent interest 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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Defendants' counterclaim had been dismissed during the time of 
trial and prior to the time any evidence was put on concerning 
said counterclaim. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants seek to have the Supreme Court rule that 
plaintiffs had forfeited the $35,000 earnest money which they had 
paid; and to have the case remanded so that defendants may put on 
evidence concerning their damages. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiffs in this matter are experienced land developers 
and had on November 15 and 16, 1979, entered into two earnest 
money agreements for the purchase of 105 acres and 37.75 acres 
respectively from Cedar Hills Development Company later known as 
Cedar Hills Investment and Land Company. Cedar Hills Investment 
and Land Company is a partnership consisting of Associated 
Industrial Developers, a California corporation, and Near East 
Technological Services, Limited, a California corporation. 
The total sum of $35,000 was paid at the time o~ the 
execution of the two earnest money agreements, which amount was 
subsequently released by the real estate agent to the sellers in 
exchange for a letter of indemnification. On approximately 
February 6, 1978 some two and one-half months after the execution 
of the earnest money agreements, an amendment agreement was 
entered into between the parties which modified the earnest money 
agreements. 
According to the terms of the earnest money agreements, the 
two sales were contingent upon annexation of the property into the 
-2-
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Town of Cedar Hills and obtaining approval of a preliminary plat. 
Both of these conditions had been accomplished by January 4, 1978. 
The earnest money agreements further provided that a total 
payment of $215,000 would be made within 30 days of the date when 
preliminary plat approval was given and annexation had occurred, 
which according to the January 4 date, would make said payment due 
on February 3, 1978. This payment was never made or tendered by 
the purchasers. 
The earnest money agreements had two provisions for 
forfeiture of the plaintiffs' rights in the event of non-payment. 
On line 39 and 40, the usual provision whereby the seller could 
retain all amounts paid as earnest money as liquidated damages, 
and also typed in after line 52 on the earnest money agreements 
was a provision that buyers would forfeit all of their interest if 
the $215,000 payment was not made within the 30-day period (by 
February 3, 1978). 
By reason of the fact that the plaintiffs were in default as 
per the provisions of the earnest money agreements and subject to 
lose their rights to purchase the property as well as their earnest 
money, a meeting was scheduled at the office of William Malis in 
South Pasadena, California between the real estate agents and the 
sellers. At that meeting, which was held February 6, 1978, the 
amendment to the earnest money agreements was prepared and was 
signed by William Malis on behalf of Cedar Hills Development 
Company. The amendment agreement was then brought back to Utah 
where it was reviewed by the plaintiffs and after discussing the 
matter with the real estate agents, it was signed by both Mr. 
-3-
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Carson and Mr. Bastian. 
The amendment agreement made several changes in the original 
earnest money agreements, most of which are insignificant as it 
relates to this lawsuit. However, of importance is the fact that 
paragraph 2(a) states as follows: 
"Buyer agrees as follows: All conditions mentioned in the 
earnest money receipts and offer to purchase mentioned above 
obligating buyers first payment therein, are hereby deemed 
satisfied as of January 4, 1978." 
The amendment agreement further provided for the payment of 
the sum of $215,000 to be made at the time of the signing of the 
agreement. However, the parties agreed that this payment was to 
be made at a closing which was verbally agreed to and which was 
scheduled for February 17, 1978 at the office of Rocky Mountain 
Title Company in Orem, Utah. 
George Drivas, agent for defendants came from California to 
attend the closing, however, the plaintiffs never tendered any 
funds at that time and the closing never was effected. There was 
much discussion at that time concerning the number of sewer 
hookups and culinary water connections that were available for the 
development of the property. 
In anticipation of the closing, the title company had drawn 
the documents, including an escrow agreement (Exhibit 36) and the 
uniform real estate contract (Exhibit 35). Further, the closing 
statements themselves were penciled in, including the pro ration 
of taxes, etc. It is undisputed by the parties that the reason 
the closing failed was because of the question of the number of 
sewer hookups in the development of the property. There was no 
-4-
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discussion at the time of closing as to the condition of the title 
of the property nor the ability of the defendants to convey the 
property, if, in fact, the closing had taken place. 
On March 3, 1978, defendants, through their attorney, gave 
written notice to plaintiffs' attorney that the sellers were 
electing the option in the earnest money agreement to retain the 
earnest money sums that had been paid. On March 27, 1978, 
plaintiffs filed the lawsuit. Paragraph 8 of the Complaint 
purported to be a tender on the part of the plaintiffs of the 
amounts due on the earnest money agreements. In response to that 
tender, defendants, through their attorney, made a formal request 
that a sum certain be tendered in the form of a cashier's check 
(Exhibit 23). No response was ever received from the plaintiffs 
or their attorney to that letter. 
Thereafter, on May~3, 1978, Mr. Carson had arranged, subject 
to certain conditions, to obtain a loan that would allow him to 
proceed and close the transaction (Exhibit 34). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN HOLDING THAT THE 
PLAINTIFFS WERE NOT READY, WILLING AND ABLE TO COMPLETE THE 
TRANSACTION AS PROVIDED FOR IN THE AGREEMENTS. 
Plaintiff claims error by reason of the trial court's finding 
that plaintiffs were not ready, willing and able to perform under 
the contracts, (Exhibit 9, 10, and 14). In the context of a 
contract to purchase real property, this amounts to a question of 
whether or not the parties performed, or tendered their performance 
-5-
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as required by the contract to purchase. It is plaintiffs' 
contention that performance or tendered performance, (specifically 
tender of payment) was not necessary as a result of the trial 
court's finding No. 6 where it was held that: 
"Defendant was not in a position to deliver the necessary 
titles to plaintiff." (R. 108). 
Plaintiff offers this finding as justification or as a legal 
excuse for its failure to perform or tender its performance. 
While in particular cases such a legal excuse does exist, which 
relieves a purchaser of his duty to perform or tender performance, 
this court has been very clear in outlining the circumstances 
necessary for application of this exception to the general rules 
governing tender and performance. 
The general rule is stated in 86 CJS, Tender, Section 3: 
"Where the existence of a right in one claiming it is 
dependent on the performance of duties on his part, as by the 
payment of money or its equivalent, tender of performance by 
him is necessary to enable him to sue to enforce the right." 
This policy was echoed by this court in Marlowe Investment 
Corporation, vs. Radmall, 26 Utah 2d 124, 485 P.2d 1402 (1971): 
"Ordinarily, such a vendor does not necessarily have to have 
marketable title until the purchaser has made his payments." 
( 1404). 
In other words, the vendor's performance wasn't required, and 
as a result, there could be no vendor default until the purchaser 
had first performed or tendered performance. 
Plaintiff suggests that this general rule is not applicable 
in the case at bar because the trial court held that defendant did 
not have the "necessary titles" ready for delivery to the 
plaintiff. This exception was applied by the court in 
-6-
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American Savings and Loan Association vs. Blomquist, 24 Utah 2d 
35, 465 P.2d 383 (1970), where the court reviewed circumstances 
similar to those in the present controversy: 
"The position of Blomquist is that as vendors they were not 
required to have marketable title all during the pendancy of 
the contract, but only when the final payment was made or 
tendered; and that sellers could not claim breach of the 
contract until they had made or tendered all payments 
thereon. They argue that even though the property was under 
foreclosure, they had the possibility of making good title 
until the end of the redemption period, and that they 
therefore, were entitled to have the purchasers continue ~he 
payments. We do not disagree with the arguments nor with the 
cases cited in appropriate circumstances. But where it is 
shown that there is no possibility that the vendor will be 
ever able to convey good title, the purchaser of the property 
is not required to continue on the useless course of paying 
up in full and making demand for an obviously impossible 
performance. Whether this is the fact is something for the 
trial court to determine." (p. 37). 
The court makes it very clear that the exception to the 
general rule that tender of performance or performance is required 
is to be applied when the vendor's performance obviously becomes 
impossible, and where there is no possibility of his ever being 
able to perform. In the case at bar, no evidence was produced from 
any source that defendants' performance under the contracts was 
impossible, or that there was no possibility of ever being able to 
perform. To the contrary, Mr. Church, the title company officer 
who prepared the title reports and closing documents, testified 
that the encumbrances on title could be resolved: 
"Q: (By Mr. Wilson) Is there any reason that you are aware 
of as to why this transaction could not continue to have been 
closed in a matter of a day or two? 
A: (By Mr. Church) I think any of them [title questions] 
could have been resolved or accomplished." (R. 521, lines 19 
to 23.) 
-7-
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Mr. Church's testimony was corroborated by the testimony of 
Reed Nixon, an agent of the defendant as follows: 
"Q: (By Mr. Wilson) Could the matter have been closed? 
A: (By Mr. Nixon) Yes. 
Q: Now, when you say yes, will you tell us the time frame of 
what it would have taken to have closed it? 
A: Yes, what it would have taken was to have the money 
tendered by the buyers so that these obligations, which is 
the normal thing at closing, to the title company and 
escrowed and then the obligations are paid off and then the 
underlying contracts and then, of course, the documents that 
were to be signed at that time could all be properly 
recorded. 
Q: And were you as the agent and person who made the 
conveyance, or at least, could have made the conveyance, were 
you capable of conveying the 16 acres that were to be 
released? 
A: Yes." 
There was no evidence presented at trial which would suggest 
that the defendants could not perform. The above referred to 
testimony presents a contrary conclusion, that it was definitely 
possible that the vendor could provide title to the 16 acres which 
was to be released. Plaintiffs have presented no evidence and the 
trial court did not hold that defendants could never perform or 
that such performance by defendants was impossible and as a 
result, the exception to the general rule· that tender is required 
should not be applied in this case. The application of this legal 
excuse or justification for failure to perform or tender 
performance is very limited. According to the weight of 
authority: 
"For encumbrances to serve as an excuse for failure of 
demand, tender or performance, there must be a natural 
inability on the part of the vendor to perform, and it is not 
-8-
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sufficient that at the time of performance there is an 
encumbrance on the property if the vendor is able to remove 
it ••• "(92 CJS Vendor and Purchaser, Section 580g). 
This factual circumstance falls squarely within the above 
delineated rule, and defendant urges the court to reject 
plaintiffs' contention that it was excused from having to abide 
the technicality of tender (plaintiffs' brief, page 37). 
Plaintiffs make a second argument for the proposition that it 
was not required to perform or tender performance, and bases that 
position on the decision of this court in Huck vs. Hayes, 560 P.2d 
1124 (1977). It is important to make several key distinctions 
between the Huck factual background and that of the present case. 
First, the nature of the action itself. In Huck the plaintiff was 
suing for specific performance whereas the plaintiff in the 
instant case chose to withdraw his cause for specific performance 
and preceeded on damages alone. In the present case, there has 
never been a bona fide tender of performance; whereas in Huck, the 
plaintiff delivered to the realtor conducting the transaction, a 
cashier's check for the total amount of the defendants equity in 
the property. Finally, in Huck, the plaintiffs tender of payment 
was repeatedly rejected by the defendant, while in the present 
case, the defendants have not received a tender even though there 
has been a specific request for a tender to be made. (Exhibit 23). 
Huck stands for the proposition that where the purchasers had 
tendered payment, failure to make a reciprocal performance by the 
vendor places him in default. This ruling is not inconsistent in 
the least with the finding of the trial court that plaintiff was 
not ready, willing, and able to perform, in deed, that plaintiff 
_O_ 
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did not perform nor ever tendered performance. Clearly, the 
factual circumstances which were deemed dispositive in the Huck 
case simply are not present in the case at bar, and the court is 
urged to uphold the trial court's finding that plaintiff failed to 
perform. 
A final argument in support of this assignment of error is 
ventured by the plaintiff to the effect that if a tender is 
required, then the letter (Exhibit 42) to defendant dated February 
23, 1978, qualifies under the statutory tender section, 78-27-1, 
UCA. The last paragraph of that letter reads: 
"If you are willing to discuss the affording of an easement 
for the additional lagoon systems as an alternative to the 
existing contracts requiring 42 hookups to your present 
lagoon syst~m, subject to the approval of the State Health 
Department, we would appreciate hearing directly from you as 
we are prepared to close the matter within the next 10 days." 
This paragraph fails under the statutory tender rule of UCA 
78-27-1 on two separate grounds. First, there is no "offer in 
writing to pay a particular sum of money" as is expressly required 
in the Section. There is nothing more than a bare assertion that 
the plaintiffs were prepared to close within 10 days if certain 
conditions were met, primarily, relating to the granting of an 
easement for sewer lagoons. Such an "offer" is patently defective 
under the statutory tender rule, for that reason alone. Add to 
that the fact that the offer made by the plaintiffs was inherently 
defective for reasons other than simply not physically producing 
the money, (which the statutory tender rule was formulated to 
excuse). 
In Hyams vs. Bamberger, 360 P. 202 (1894) the court ruled on 
-10-
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the proper application of the predecessor statutory tender 
section, UCA 78-27-1, (The statutes were identical), saying: 
"Where a man makes a tender in writing, the statute excuses 
him from actually producing the money at the time of making 
tender, but it excuses no other act or requirement on his 
part which would be necessary to make a valid tender, 
independently of the statute." 
When the trial court ruled in finding No. 2 that the 
requirement to provide 42 sewer hookups was waived by plaintiff in 
the amendment agreement, (Exhibit 14) it undercut the legal 
support by which plaintiff could require either the provision of 
hookups, or as an alternative, the granting of an easement for the 
sewer lagoons, as a condition precedent to tender of payment. 
This court in Sieverts vs. White, 2 Utah 2d 351, 273 P.2d 974 
(1954) acknowledged the general rule that: 
"A tender to be good must be free from any condition which 
the tenderer does not have a right to insist upon. • • the 
plaintiffs here had no right to insist upon delivery of a 
deed as a condition to their making a tender of purchase 
price • • • " 
By analogy, in the present controversy, plaintiffs had no 
legal right to insist upon either performance, (provision of 
hookups or granting of an easement) from defendants, and the 
"offer" even though purported to fall under the protection of the 
statutory tender provision, fails for reason outside that which 
UCA 78-27-1 is intended to excuse. Once again, the court is urged 
to reject this attempt to excuse nonperformance and failure to 
tender payment on the part of plaintiffs and to uphold the trial 
court's findings in so far as they impose the consequences of the 
plaintiffs failure to pay or tender performance to defendant. 
POINT II 
-11-
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THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN NOT AWARDING PLAINTIFF EITHER 
DAMAGES OR ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
Plaintiffs contend that the trial court committed error in 
determining that their claim for damages and attorney's fees was 
groundless. In responding to that argument, the conclusions of 
the analysis in the foregoing section on plaintiffs' failure to 
perform or tender performance will be referred to. The general 
rule governing breach of contract actions in which the purchaser 
is seeking damages is two pronged. First, it must be abundantly 
clear that the seller breached the contract and even more 
important, in the analysis at hand, it must be equally clear that 
the purchaser is not himself in default. 
The focus of plaintiffs' assignment of error to the court is 
that the seller did not breach the contract and that plaintiffs 
are therefore, not entitled to maintain an action for damages 
arising out of a purported breach of the contract. The finding of 
the trial court was that plaintiffs were not ready, willing and 
able to perform at the appointed time, and that it made no attempt 
to perform or tender performance as required under the earnest 
money contracts as modified by the amendment agreement (Exhibits 
9, 10, and 14). The conclusion which follows is that regardless 
of defendants' breach or performance under the agreements, the 
fact remains that plaintiffs had failed in their obligation under 
the documents, and consequently, should be precluded from 
maintaining an action for breach of contract with its attendant 
claim for damages. 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT RULED CORRECTLY THAT THE REQUIREMENT FOR 
FURNISHING OF SEWER HOOKUPS WAS WAIVED. 
Defendants argue that the trial court's finding No. 2, which 
stated that the amendment agreement, (Exhibit 14), was a full and 
complete waiver of any requirement that defendants provide sewer 
hookups was in error. Support for this assertion consists only of 
subsequent argument by plaintiff that the hookups were necessary 
and that it would have been foolish to waive this requirement. 
Tpe amendment agreement, which was undated, but according to the 
testimony of witnesses, was drafted on or about February 6, 1978, 
(R. 663 lines 10-12) ~nd signed by plaintiffs prior to February 
17, 1978, is explicit and clear in its meaning: 
"Paragraph No. 2: Buyer agrees as follows: (a) all 
conditions mentioned in the earnest money receipts and offers 
to purchase mentioned above obligating buyers' first payment 
thereon are hereby deemed satisfied as of January 4, 1978." 
It is significant to note that at the time the amendment was 
drafted, plaintiffs were already in default under the contract, 
having failed to make the prescribed first payment within 30 days 
or receiving preliminary plat approval and obtaining annexation, 
both of which occurred by January 4, 1978. In view of the 
default, but desiring to accommodate plaintiffs and keep the 
transaction alive, defendants agreed to extend the time for 
plaintiffs' performance to such time as the amendment was signed. 
Four conditions were included in the amendment to which plaintiffs 
agreed: 
1. That all conditions precedent to buyers' obligation to 
-13-
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make its first payment of $175,000 and $40,000 respectively, would 
be deemed to be already satisfied as of January 4, 1978. 
2. The initial total payment of $215,000 would be forth 
coming at the time the amendment was to be signed by the 
plaintiffs. 
3. That the buyers' payment schedule be accelerated 
approximately one month in order to coincide with sellers 
underlying contractual obligations on the property. 
4. That buyers would execute quit claim deeds to sellers in 
order to expedite clearing title should buyers fail to perform 
under the contract. 
Given this exchange of consideration, all of which the 
parties to the amendment agreement bargained for, the terms and 
conditions of the amendment became binding on the parties and the 
contract became enforceable. 
Finding No. 2 is merely· a recognition of this fact and 
operates independent of the subsequent changes of heart of either 
party. 
DATED this 2Cj day of July, 1980. 
N 
~B-ff-l:lQ.3;'11-for Respondents 
350 t Center 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing to M. 
Dayle Jeffs, Attorney for Appellants, 90 North 100 East, Provo, 
Utah, 84601, postage prepaid this 29 day of July, 1980. 
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